INTRODUCTION
The correct and timely implementation of European Union (EU) law by the Member States is an essential element in upholding the Union foundations. This article investigates the role of three alternative compliance mechanisms in the EU: The Internal Market Scoreboard (IMS), SOLVIT and EU-Pilot. These mechanisms are theoretically meant as complementary and practical, cost-reducing (in terms of capacity, time and money) alternatives to the EU infringement procedures and national court procedures. The idea behind these mechanisms is, through peer pressure and informal contacts, to prevent citizens and businesses that encounter problems with the application of EU law from having to start time-consuming and costly court procedures.
Moreover, they serve to correct infringements of EU law at an early stage without recourse to official infringement procedures by the Commission. This article discusses how alternative problem-solving mechanisms work in practice, how they fit in the EU legal system and what, if any, influence they have on the official EU infringement procedures. It will be shown how the existence of such alternative mechanisms lead to increased Member State compliance with EU law.
EU COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS
In this article, "compliance mechanisms" refer to those systems set up within the European Union to induce Member State compliance with EU law. These compliance mechanisms can be seen as representatives of two compliance models: the managerial and the enforcement model. The management model, as proposed by Chayes and Chayes, is one of cooperation, where justification, discourse and persuasion are used to make states comply. 3 They start from the premise that non-compliance by states is not necessarily due to deliberate defiance. The enforcement model on the other hand, as first described by Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, is based on cooperation, enforcement, and "the endogenous quality of rules". 4 In contrast to the management theory, states, as rational actors that weigh the benefits and costs of their actions against each other, might willfully choose not to comply when this suits them. In this model therefore, compliance is structured around state incentives in order to induce compliance, with the use of sanctions in the case of non-compliance.
This article views the infringement procedure as a mechanism belonging to the enforcement model (although some managerial elements are included as well, especially in the earlier stages of the procedure), while it considers the other mechanisms discussed (the IMS, SOLVIT and EU-Pilot) as more of a managerial type. This is largely due to the fact that the infringement procedures involve a harder, judicial side including the ultimate possibility of penalties, while the other procedures are more of a softer type where hard sanctions are not part of the system.
Infringement Procedures
Art. 258 TFEU (ex 226 EC) and 260 TFEU (ex 228 EC) comprise the infringement procedures. 5 They describe how the Commission can act when it considers a Member State has failed to fulfill an obligation under the Treaties.
The procedure consists of the following stages. First, in the pre-258 phase, the Commission will investigate the circumstances of the suspected infringement through fact-finding and discussions with the Member State. Of all cases of suspected infringement, 38% is closed during this informal phase. Second, when the outcome of the first phase is not satisfactory, the Commission can decide to send a so-called letter of formal notice, which starts the formal phase of the procedures. Here the Member State is officially offered the possibility to submit its observations. During this phase, an additional 38% of the cases is closed. If again no satisfactory reply is received from the Member State, the Commission can decide to send a reasoned opinion, in which it sets out its detailed reasoning for its suspicion of an infringement. Another 13% of cases is closed during this formal phase. When the Commission, after this stage, is still not satisfied with the situation, it can decide to start the third, judicial phase and take the non-compliant Member State to the Court of Justice. The figure below shows what percentage of cases is closed (cumulatively) during each stage before the judicial phase. 5 Art. 259 TFEU (ex 227 EC) is also part of the infringement procedures. That article applies to cases where a Member State believes another Member State has not fulfilled its obligations under the Treaties, and may therefore bring the case to the Court of Justice itself (if the Commission has decided not to do so). However, this has occurred only five times in the half century that the possibility exists, and will therefore not be discussed in this article. 
Early Closure
As is shown in the figure, almost 95% of all cases is closed before the start of the judicial phase, also called "early closure". Presumably, the preliminary (formal and informal) contacts between the Commission and the Member States thus play a significant role in the prevention of judicial steps in the infringement procedures. Different explanations can be found for this occurrence, of which three are essential. have actually not transposed the directives, but they also may have done so and not notified the Commission of this fact. In most cases, the Member State is simply late in transposing the directive. In 2010, for example, the average delay in transposing internal market directives was 5.8 months, with 0.9% of all directives for which the implementation deadline had passed not yet implemented. 9 Of course, late implementation is by itself an infringement of EU law and can and will be subject to infringement proceedings. However, most of these types of cases -unawareness and non-communication -tend to be closed relatively quickly. Especially cases involving citizens or organizations tend to attract attention by for example the European Parliament or the press, which adds pressure for the Commission to address the issue. Most Member States therefore prefer to remedy the situation before the start of judicial procedures.
A third reason for the resolution of infringements in the pre-judicial stages of the infringement procedures can be found in the Commission discretion. The fact that a case is closed in an earlier stage, does not necessarily mean that the infringement has actually been resolved. A Member State can still be non-compliant, but the Commission has complete discretion in deciding whether or not to pursue the case. 11 Moreover, the Commission is not held to give its reasons for closing a certain case. Nevertheless, pursuant to a 1997 inquiry by the European Ombudsman, the Commission has decided it will inform complainants of its reasons for not pursuing a case. 12 The involvement of complainants in infringement procedures, however, ends there. If the Commission decides to not pursue a case for, say, political reasons, it remains their prerogative. 13
Rationale for alternatives
The fact that 95% of all infringement cases are closed in the pre-judicial stage does not mean that cases are solved quickly. On average, an internal market infringement procedure, for example, takes two years to be closed in the informal stage -almost half of all cases take more than two years. The judicial stage is not much quicker, here as well the average time for a Member State to comply with the Court ruling is over one and a half year. For citizens, businesses and other complainants this timeline is often too long. They will have felt the negative consequences of late or incorrect transposition during the on average two to four years that it takes for cases to be handled by the Commission in the infringement procedures. This situation is aggravated by the fact that the Commission has complete discretion in deciding which 11 This follows from the wording of Art. 258 TFEU ('If the Commission considers that a MS has failed to fulfill an obligation under the Treaties, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion […] . If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice.' (emphasis added)), also acknowledged in e.g. Case 247/87, Star Fruit v Commission, [1989] ECR 291, where the court stated the Commission is not obliged to commence proceedings but has a discretionary power in this regard. 12 The European Ombudsman, Annual Report for 1997, pp 270-271, own initiative inquiry 303/97/PD. 13 This fact shows the tension that exists between the Commission's role as a political body and an objective enforcement body, see e.g. Smith, M., 'Enforcement, monitoring, verification, outsourcing: the decline and decline of the infringement process ', (2008) States as well as the public of the infringement situation in the EU, thereby intending -through peer-pressure and the dissemination of best practices -to induce more compliance in the Member States. Second, SOLVIT was designed in 2002 as a fast, low-cost alternative dispute settlement mechanism to help citizens and businesses when they encounter problems due to misapplication of Internal Market rules. 14 Through SOLVIT, many suspected infringements can be resolved quickly and effectively without direct involvement of the Commission. Third, EU-Pilot was set up in 2008 to provide solutions to problems arising from the misapplication of EU law (other than Internal Market rules), to obtain quicker and better responses to enquiries for information, and to work more closely and informally with the Member States.
Internal Market Scoreboard
One of the cornerstones of the European Community is the internal market and the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. In order for the Commission, the Council and the Member States to keep a check on progress with regard to the internal market, the Internal Market Scoreboard (IMS) publishes twice-yearly reports since 1997. 15 The information in these 14 It is estimated that the cost savings due to SOLVIT amounted to €128 million in 2009 (2009 . 15 The IMS was first proposed in the Commission Communication to the European Council, "Action Plan for the Single Market", CSE (97) "Home" Center). 23 It is also possible that the Commission relays a complaint it has received through other channels to the SOLVIT center, if it believes the problem could be solved in a satisfactory manner without its own involvement. The Home Center will check whether the problem does indeed concern internal market rules and if all necessary background information is complete. The case will then be automatically forwarded through an online database to the SOLVIT center in the country where the problem had occurred (the "Lead" SOLVIT Center). The two SOLVIT Centers will work together in solving the problem within a target deadline of 10 weeks. 24 Given this short deadline, the SOLVIT centers are allowed to refuse cases that require a change in national law or other implementing provisions (SOLVIT+ cases). These cases would be too difficult to handle with informal means within ten weeks. However, many centers do sometimes accept these cases and are able to therefore also offer more structural solutions and not only solve the individual case at hand.
In 2009, the majority of cases was solved before the 10-week deadline, while only 14% of the cases eventually remained unresolved within the SOLVIT system. 25 The biggest problem with the SOLVIT system is the amount of cases that are submitted to the centers which are outside the SOLVIT competence. In 2009, 69% of cases submitted to SOLVIT were outside its remit. What effect this continued increase has on the infringement procedures themselves (if any), will be discussed later in this article.
EU-PILOT
EU Member States and Commission authorities are meant to work together to ensure understanding and application of EU law. 29 However, in case of the infringement procedures, this cooperation was never officially structured. The , where citizens will be helped directly, or referred to the instance (e.g. SOLVIT, Eurojus, Europe Direct Network) that may best serve them. This will ensure that many cases outside SOLVIT's remit will not go to SOLVIT, but directly to the appropriate service (Commission staff working paper -Action plan on an integrated approach for providing Single market Assistance Services to citizen and business, SEC (2008)1882). 28 This number refers to all actual SOLVIT cases, thus excluding the 69% of cases that are outside SOLVIT's remit. 29 As follows from e.g. Art. 
COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS' POSITION IN THE EU LEGAL SYSTEM
The Commission originally established the mechanisms that we have just discussed, with a view to prevent, as well as quickly and effectively solve problems concerning the implementation and application of EU law. Section four will discuss whether and how these newer mechanisms have indeed 36 If urgency is required, the Commission may decide to launch an infringement procedure right away, without going through the steps in Pilot. 37 The remaining five Members (Greece, France, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta) are set to join over the course of 2011.
contributed to problem solving in the EU, and how they interact in reality with the more established, official infringement procedures. Before we do so, however, we need to establish where and how these mechanisms fit within the EU legal system. This current section will therefore discuss the aim and scope of the different mechanisms, the role of the actors involved, and how the newer mechanisms interact legally with the infringement procedures. 
Legal basis and interaction
We saw that the newer mechanisms are intended as complementary or alternative systems to the infringement procedures, aiming to induce compliance with EU law. All these alternative mechanisms were established by the Commission, in its capacity as Guardian of the Treaties. 43 We also saw 43 
Degree of Softness
To show how these four systems interact with each other, it is possible to rank them in terms of 'softness', as shown in the figure below. 
Alternatives or Complements?
The fact that all systems involve the same actors, and some cover the same areas of EU law, does not mean they work as mere alternatives. They work as 
Some data on the infringement procedures and alternatives
To ascertain what influence the alternative systems have had on the infringement procedures, we will simply start with taking a look at the historical data regarding the infringement procedures. 
First distortion: EU enlargement
One obvious factor influencing the statistics for the infringement procedures is the number of EU members. Most notably in the above figure is the influence of the three EU enlargements (1994, 2004, and 2007) . Since all new Member States had to accept and effectively implement the acquis communautaire on accession, it is not surprising this implementation would lead to a higher amount of infringements of EU law in the years following accession. Figure 6 below therefore shows the same analysis as we made above, but only for EU-15, thereby eliminating the effects of EU 
Internal Market
Given the lack of data on the PILOT system due to its recent existence, it is more interesting to look at the IMS and SOLVIT. These are both systems that are targeted for legislation in the internal market area, so any effects of these mechanisms should be magnified when we look at internal market data alone. What we also see, is a sharp decline in the number of cases based on complaints after 2008. An explanation for this may be found in the introduction of Pilot. Although the system is not meant to target Internal Market issues, it does serve as a sort of signposting service. We saw earlier that in the first year of Pilot's existence, 21% of all cases concerned Internal Market cases. If cases concerning bad application are submitted to Pilot, these are forwarded to the relevant SOLVIT center. However, if these complaints concern e.g. non-conformity of national legislation with EU legislation, this falls within the scope of Pilot, hence explaining the 21%. Possibly, the handling of these types of complaints through Pilot explains the decline in Internal Market infringement cases based on complaints.
Second distortion: number of directives
The difficulty with basing any conclusions on the figures above, lies with the fact that other elements apart from the introduction of the compliance mechanisms may cause any and all of the changes that we observe. We have already mentioned and accounted for the distortion caused by the two EU enlargements during the course of our observations. Another problem is, however, the amount of directives that need to 
Data imperfections
The previous paragraph has shown that no clear-cut answers can be found by casual observation of the available data. Our statistical analysis has shown that some observations can be made based on aggregate data. When we looked at the data for EU-15 only, some of the interference caused by EU enlargement could be filtered out.
It was impossible, however, to examine the internal market data for EU-15 alone, given the imperfect data, we can say about the interaction between the infringement procedures and its alternatives.
Statistical link
First of all, there is no obvious statistical link between the two types of mechanisms.
This means that the alternative mechanisms probably should be seen as On the other hand, if the alternative mechanisms did not exist, more complaints would be made to the Commission. The Commission has only limited resources, and would thus have to prioritize even more than it already does. This would leave a greater opportunity for non-compliance with EU law by the Member States, since the probability of getting caught diminishes. This is of course a marginal issue, but does play a role in our investigation.
Second, even if we could establish a firm link between the two types of mechanisms, the use of the systems and the number of procedures are no indication of absolute compliance with EU law. Due to the outlined inconsistencies in the reported data and given Commission discretion, not to mention the fact that not all actual infringements are detected, the reported number of infringement procedures is no reliable indicator for compliance. However, it can tell us something about relative compliance (sectoral, over time, or between countries). Since any effect of the alternative mechanisms on the infringement procedures is necessarily relative -the effectiveness of the infringement procedures before and after the introduction of an alternative, for example -this is not a real problem.
Now that we know the limits of our statistical analysis, we can investigate how effective the systems are. Effective not only in reaching the stated aims of inducing compliance, but also in terms of time-and cost reduction. As was stated previously, the infringement procedures seem highly effective, given the fact that 95% of all cases are closed before going to the Court of Justice, while only very rarely are cases referred to the Court of Justice under art. 260 TFEU. With a near 100% closure rate for all cases after completion of all stages, the procedure is indeed quite effective.
However, to what extent the procedure also induces actual compliance with EU law in the Member States is unclear.
One of the purposes of the system is to deter future non-compliance -it is quite difficult to establish exactly whether it achieves this aim. The fact that 55% of all directives in 2008 had passed the deadline for transposition, without communication from the Member States as to their implementing measures, would indicate that the incentive to communicate measures on time is not very strong. Most of these cases are solved satisfactorily within a few months into the procedure, but it would of course be more effective if the system would have Member States comply before the procedure is actually set in motion.
The second purpose of the system is to induce compliance with EU law in Member States in general. As we noted before, however, the number of infringement procedures is a poor indicator for compliance with EU law. We will therefore be able to actually measure effectiveness on a relative basis only.
The effectiveness of the alternative mechanisms is even more difficult to gauge. The IMS, for example, works through naming-and-shaming and peer pressure. Given the softness of these factors, the influence of such mechanisms is notoriously difficult to measure. SOLVIT, on the other hand, calls itself the network for "effective problem solving". It is true that SOLVIT provides effective solutions for many practical problems, but the effectiveness of the system as a whole has never been measured. Almost a quarter of all cases remain unresolved within the system. 53
Moreover, the cases that are handled by SOLVIT are selected on the criterion of there 53 http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/statistics/index_en.htm.
being "a good chance that it can be resolved pragmatically" 54 , thereby causing selection bias. It will thus be very difficult to determine the effectiveness of such a system.
Whether Pilot is an effective system is difficult to say after such a short existence. The Commission has decided to leave the test phase and continue the mechanism indefinitely, obviously convinced of its use. 55 Of all three complementary systems, Pilot is indeed the one that will probably have the largest impact on the infringement procedures. This is not surprising, however, since the Commission itself proposes to use the system as a replacement of the so-called administrative letter, the first step in the informal pre-258 phase. Pilot ensures more clarity, transparency and speed in the informal phase, thereby creating opportunities to more quickly solve problems before they reach the formal stage of the procedures.
The first data we have available on the system seem indeed to corroborate this theory.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article has investigated the role of three alternative compliance mechanisms in the EU: the Internal Market Scoreboard, SOLVIT and EU Pilot. It was shown that these systems together have a similar aim, scope, and actors as the official infringement procedures. Theoretically, their effective functioning should induce compliance and thereby reduce the number of infringement procedures started each year by the Commission under article 258 TFEU. When we looked at the data available for these four systems, we found some evidence that the systems indeed reduce the number of the infringement procedures, especially so in case of SOLVIT and Pilot. However, giving the problems regarding the data available to us, and the short time Pilot has been in existence, it is difficult to prove there is an actual firm statistical link between the two types of systems.
Nevertheless, the alternative systems probably do lead to increased compliance in the EU. We established that our statistics cannot teach us much on actual compliance with EU law, since infringement procedures are a poor indicator 54 http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/about/index_en.htm#how. 55 2009 Pilot Evaluation Report.
of absolute compliance. They do not capture undetected non-compliance, nor is it clear how much non-compliance remains due to e.g. the Commission's discretion.
The effectiveness of the alternative systems, however, especially SOLVIT and Pilot, can be found precisely in a higher detection rate after their introduction. Since the number of cases entered in these systems have increased dramatically, while no parallel dramatic decrease can be seen in the infringement procedures, this probably means that different types of cases are brought to the alternative systems by different types of complainants. These complainants would probably not have submitted their complaint to the Commission, nor would the types of cases often actually have led to infringement procedures. SOLVIT and Pilot offer a more informal channel to file complaints, thereby lowering the barrier for both complainants and Member States.
Although any interaction between the infringement procedures and the alternative systems is quite minimal in terms of reduction in the number of infringement procedures, the EU's alternative compliance mechanisms thus do lead to increased absolute compliance in the EU.
